For example, in my paper with Nolan Miller and Richard Zeckhauser on eliciting effort and honest evaluations, honest reporting of one's evaluation of a product is a best response (in expected value terms) if everyone else is also reporting honestly. It's best in expected value terms, but in particular realizations, an individual may regret reporting honestly. And the proof that it's best in expected value terms depends on understanding: a) the logarithm function, and b) either Jensen's inequality, or the ability to take a derivative of the log function.
The issue came up again today in a talk I saw incoming SI Ph.D. student John Lin give about lab experiments with different mutli-unit auction formats.
Someone should do some research about how to convince users that non-strategic behavior is incentive compatible when mathematical analysis demonstrates that it is. If you know of any work related to this, I'd love to hear about it.